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CHAPTER 17 
Corporations 
MICHAEL B. ELEPHANTE* 
§ 17.1. The Impact of Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. on 
the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs. The decision of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 1 is of major importance. 
The Court in Donohue held that the stockholders of a closely held cor-
poration owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty-the 
utmost good faith and loyalty -in the operation of the enterprise that 
partners owe to one another,2 and that, when a corporation purchases 
shares from a member of the stockholder-director group controlling 
the corporation, the standard can not be met unless the offer to 
purchase is made pro rata to all stockholders. 3 
The section following this one includes a general analysis of the 
Donohue decision. 4 This section addresses the narrower topic of the 
probable impact of Donohue on the law of corporate freeze-outs, par-
ticularly those involving public corporations. As a starting point, this 
section will review the law of corporate freeze-outs, The discussion of 
freeze-outs will be followed by a review of a freeze-out technique fre-
quently contemplated by public corporations today: the "going pri-
vate" transaction. After the "going private" analysis, there will be a re-
view of Massachusetts decisions regarding freeze-outs prior to 
Donohue, and then a discussion of the impact of Donohue itself on 
freeze-out transactions. A comment of post-Donohue transactions, 
focusing on the relationship between state corporate law and federal 
securities law in the area of freeze-outs, will conclude the article. 
I. A REVIEW OF THE LAw OF CoRPORATE FREEZE-OUTS 
Interest in the law of corporate freeze-outs has been increased re-
cently by a new freeze-out technique attempted by public corporations 
*MICHAEL B. ELEPHANTE is an associate in the law firm of Hemenway & Barnes, Bos-
ton. 
§17.1. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 328 N.E.2d 505. 
2 /d. at 1315-16, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
3 Id. at 1323, 328 N.E.2d at 521. 
4 See § 17.2 infra. 
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in the last several years: "going private."5 Attempts to "go private" 
have increased significantly as a result of the stock market boom in 
the late sixties and the subsequent depressed market conditions dur-
ing the first half of the current decade.6 This recent wave has raised 
new questions peculiar to "going private" freeze-outs, and revived the 
question whether and in what circumstances majority stockholder-
officer-directors may eliminate the interests of minority stockholders 
in a corporation. 7 
The term "freeze-out" is used here to describe a transaction in 
which the equity interest of minority stockholders in a corporation is 
eliminated. As the term implies, a freeze-out has as a purpose the 
elimination of the minority.8 "Freeze-out" is used here in a narrower 
sense than it was used by the Court in Donohue: 9 it does not include a 
variety of devices, such as the distribution of profits through salaries 
rather than dividends, that insiders can use to deprive minority stock-
holders of the economic benefit of their investment without actually 
forcing the liquidation of that investment. 10 
Freeze-outs, as so defined, can be accomplished in three principal 
ways. First, an existing corporation can effect either a long-form11 or 
a short-form12 merger with corporations owned by the majority stock-
holders, in which all stockholders or the minority stockholders receive 
• See generally Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort7, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
987 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Borden]; Note, 84 YALEL.j. 903 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Note]. 
8 For a few recent examples of corporations that have been sued in attempting to "go 
private," see Marshel v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., No. 342, at F-1 
(2d Cir. February 13, 1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 
342. at G-1 (2d Cir. February 18, 1976); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rapoport v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Civil No. 74-248 (C.D. 
Cal., filed January 30, 1974). 
7 Borden, supra .nete 5, at 987. See, e.g., Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 
568-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). 
8 Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. 
REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vorenberg]. For an indication of the 
difficulty courts often face in ascertaining the majority's predominant purpose, see 
McPhail v. L. S. Starret Co., 257 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1958). 
The use of the term "freeze-out" has been criticized on the ground that it is pejora-
tive in nature since it "bespeak[s] wrongful exclusion." Borden, supra note 5, at 988. As used 
herein, the term implies that the exclusion of the minority was purposeful, but not necessar-
ilY, wrongful. 
9 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1309,328 N.E.2d at 513. 
10 See id. at 1309-10, 328 N.E.2d at 513. 
11 See G.L. c. 156B, § 78. 
12 See G.L. c. 156B, § 82. In a recent decision, Green v. Santa Fe Indus., BNA SEc. 
REG. & L. REP., No. 342, at G-1 (2d Cir. February 18, 1976), the Second Circuit held that 
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under Rule IOb-5 although the merger in question 
was effected in compliance with the requirement of the Delaware short form merger 
statute. 
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cash or debt instruments in exchange for their shares. 13 Second, the 
same result can be achieved by a sale of the assets of the corporation 
to another corporation owned by insiders. 14 Third, a freeze-out can 
be accomplished in two steps: a tender offer by the corporation, fol-
lowed by a merger, sale of assets, or reverse stock split designed to 
eliminate nontendering minority stockholders.15 The two-step method 
has been most common in the case of "going private transactions."16 
Historically, judicial hostility toward freeze-outs was based on the 
notion that stockholders had a vested right in the profits of an 
enterprise. 17 Although nearly all modern corporation statutes have 
been amended to specifically authorize transactions that can have the 
result of eliminating the interest of some stockholders, 18 thereby vitiat-
ing the vested rights theory, substantial objections to freeze-outs re-
main. In a freeze-out, one stockholder in effect decides when another 
must sell his stock. 19 Thus, even if the forced sale does not violate a 
vested right of the seller, it does substitute another's will for that of 
the seller in a transaction in which the seller customarily expects to 
exercise his own choice. Moreover, there is the obvious suspicion that 
in deciding to sell on behalf of the minority, a controlling stockholder 
will not be acting in the interest of the minority. 20 The self-interest of 
controlling stockholders is so easy to identify and so obviously adverse 
to the interests of eliminated minority stockholders in most cases, that 
experience suggests that those in control have resolved the conflict of 
interest in favor of their own interests. In allocating the present and 
future value of the corporation among all stockholders, controlling 
stockholders are unlikely to make a pro rata allocation.21 
The effects often created by a freeze-out are also produced by a 
converse transaction, the insider bail-out. The insider bail-out is a 
transaction in which the corporation purchases the stock of one or 
more stockholders. Where a corporation is controlled by a group of 
stockholders, a bail-out may allow the group to retain control because 
the selling shareholder's shares are not placed into the hands of 
13 See G.L. c. 156B, §§ 78(b)(6), 82(a)(l). 
14 See G.L. c. 156B, § 75. 
15 Note, supra note 5, at 910. 
'
6 See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734, (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Albright v. 
Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974). 
17 See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F. 625, 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1886), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 136 U.S. 645 (1890); Weisbecker v. Hosiery Pat-
ents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244, 255-56, 51 A.2d 811, 816 (1947); Theis v. Spokane Falls Light 
Gas Co., 34 Wash. 23, 30, 74 P. 1004, 1006 (1904). 
18 See, e.g., notes 9-11 supra. 
19 Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1202. 
20 See id. at 1193; Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Utah 1974). 
21 See Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 48, 342 A.2d 566, 573 
(1975); Note, supra note 5, at 925-28. 
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another person. The transaction in Donohue involved such a bail-out.22 
Freeze-outs and bail-outs are similar in that controlling groups are 
able to offer only insubstantial corporate benefits in favor of either 
transaction. 23 
The failure to justify freeze-outs in terms of corporate benefit indi-
cates that it is unlikely that corporate purposes, rather than personal 
ones, have motivated the expenditure of corporate funds. Indeed, ex-
cept for the case of an attempt to "go private," the only corporate 
purposes that have been acknowledged to exist in such transactions 
have been the elimination of a dissenter who is blocking a transaction 
beneficial to the corporation, 24 and efficiencies achieved by a merger 
of a subsidiary into a parent. 25 With those exceptions, the alleged cor-
porate benefits of these freeze-outs are so illusory that, particularly in 
the case of closely held corporations, a prophylactic rule such as that 
adopted in Donohue may be appropriate.26 Freeze-outs are thus trans-
actions in which the principles that majority stockholders owe minor-
ity stockholders a measure of loyalty27 and that corporate officers and 
directors may not use their positions to advance their personal 
interests28 are frequently violated. 
Despite the unseemly purposes for which they may be used, 
freeze-outs have not been universally proscribed. 29 The short explana-
tion for the failure of murts to eliminate them may be discovered in 
existing corporations statutes, which implicitly authorize the majority 
to override the minority in asset sales, mergers, and the like, and pro-
vide a remedy for the minority through the option of appraisal.30 In 
the light of such statutory schemes, some courts, adopting the view 
that the statutes mean what they say, have authorized transactions that 
freeze out minority stockholders.31 Under this analysis, the right to 
seek an appraisal has been viewed as the quid pro quo for authorizing 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1301, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
23 "Going private" transactions represent a possible exception to this statement. See 
text at notes 46-48 infra. 
24 See Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952); Vorenberg, 
supra note 8, at ll96. 
25 See Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 
1952). 
28 Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Borden, supra note 5, at 
1020. 
27 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1316 n.20, 328 N.E.2d at 516 n.20. 
28 Andersen v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346, 90 N.E.2d 541, 
543 (1950); Adams v. Protective Union Co., 210 Mass. 172, 176, 96 N.E. 74, 76 (19ll). 
29 See, e.g., Beutelspacher v. Spokane Sav. Bank, 164 Wash. 227, 2 P.2d 729 (1931). 
30 Only West Virginia fails to provide for this remedy. See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 
ll89. 
31 See, e.g., Watkins v. National Bank, 51 Kan. 254, 32 P. 914 (1893); Green v. Ben-
nett, IIO S.W. 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Beutelspacher v. Spokane Sav. Bank, 164 
Wash. 227, 2 P.2d 729 (1931). 
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the majority to override.32 Furthermore, the argument has been made 
that the appraisal remedy is the exclusive means by which a dissenter 
may respond to such a transaction. 33 Even commentators who reject 
the view that corporation statutes providing for appraisal implicitly 
authorize freeze-outs believe that the contrary argument is suffi-
ciently strong to authorize freeze-outs in some circumstances. 34 
Although it has been suggested earlier that freeze-outs serving cor-
porate purposes are rare,35 most commentators concede that such 
freeze-outs do exist. 36 Such a legitimate freeze-out was the subject of 
litigation in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. 37 In Grimes, a 
federal district court was asked to enjoin a merger between a parent 
corporation (through a newly-formed, wholly-owned subsidiary) and a 
subsidiary. The court carefully analyzed the transaction and found 
that the merger would benefit both corporations by: (1) combining 
complementary businesses, (2) eliminating the inhibition to business 
dealings between the two corporations created by possible conflict of 
interest claims by minority stockholders of the subsidiary, and (3) 
making possible operational savings of up to $300,000 per year. 38 
Another decision involving a freeze-out that apparently presented a 
legitimate corporate purpose is Matteson v. Ziebarth. 39 In Matteson, a 
minority stockholder, who had blocked the acceptance of a favorable 
offer to purchase all of the stock of the corporation, was frozen out 
through a merger with another corporation controlled by the m~ority 
stockholders.40 As one commentator observed, seen as a whole, the 
transaction had the valid business purpose of enabling an advanta-
geous sale to be made.41 
As the foregoing suggests, there has been no unanimity in the 
treatment of transactions intended to freeze out minority stock-
holders. Amidst views ranging from a complete prohibition on all 
freeze-outs to complete legality in all cases where statutory procedures 
have been followed, a growing consensus appears to be forming 
around the view of Professor Vorenberg, an authority on the law of 
32 See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142,149,172 A. 452, 455 (1934); 
Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 154, 69 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1952). 
33 See Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 991, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 
56-57 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
34 See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1204. 
35 See text at notes 20-25 supra. 
38 See Vorenberg, .supra note 8, at 1195-1200, 1204; Note, supra note 5, at 922. 
37 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP .• 94,722, at 96,383 (N.D. Fla. 
1974). 
38 /d. at 96,930. 
39 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952). 
40 Id. at 290, 242 P.2d at 1029. 
41 See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1196. The corporation had lost money consistently, 
and the record indicated that it was practically forced to sell out. 40 Wash. 2d at 
289-90, 242 P.2d at 1028-29. 
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corporate freeze-outs, that freeze-outs should be permitted only when 
the majority is able to demonstrate that the freeze-out serves a valid 
business or corporate purpose.42 The business purpose test as the 
standard of analysis is an attractive one. It recognizes that freeze-outs 
are transactions that are likely to be abused and ordinarily should be 
enjoined. At the same time, it recognizes that freeze-outs may serve 
purposes other than the furtherance of the majority's interest, and 
that in those cases they should be permitted. 
The business purpose test also focuses analysis upon what appears 
to be the key question: is a corporate purpose being served by the 
transaction? If a corporate purpose is not being served, there is every 
reason to believe that the majority is attempting to disadvantage the 
minority be assigning to itself a disproportionate part of the 
corporation's value. The viability of the rule, however, is likely to be 
determined by the manner in which it is applied. If courts applying 
the business purpose test take an overly narrow or broad view of cor-
porate purpose, the adoption of what is ostensibly a useful standard 
of analysis will not have accomplished a great deal. 
II. "GOING PRIVATE" TRANSACTIONS 
The combination of the boom market in securities during the 
1967-1972 period and the subsequent decline in that market has pro-
duced a new variety of freeze-out that effects a substantial reduction 
in the number of shareholders of a widely held corporation: 43 the 
"going private" transaction.44 
"Going private" transactions tend to take place in a fairly 
stereotyped historical context. Most often corporations that have 
"gone private" or desire to "go private" first offered their securities 
for sale to the public during the hot issues market of the 1967-1972 
period. 45 In "going public," the corporations, their stockholders, or 
both sold securities to the public at prices that in retrospect seem to 
have been inflated. In most cases, the prices at which the stock in such 
42 See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1974); Grimes v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP.' 94,722, at 96,930 (N.D. Fla. 1974); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d·120, 
123, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Borden, supra note 5, at 1022; Note,supra note 
5, at 922; cf Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573. 
But see Davidj. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30,36 (Del. Ch. 1941). 
43 Almost always, it is merely a minority interest that is widely held. See Borden, supra 
note 5, at 1013-15. 
44 Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Sommer, "Going Pri-
vate": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. 
REP. '80,010, at 84,694-95 (SEC 1974) [hereinafter cited as Sommer]. 
45 See Sommer, supra note 44, at 84,694. 
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companies has since traded have declined substantially, often to the 
point at which market values are lower than book values. 46 As a result 
of this decline in price, the price at which the corporation proposes to 
reacquire its shares is well below that at which they were originally 
sold. The price differential, which benefits the same controlling 
stockholder-directors who took the corporation public, has prompted 
the suggestion that the transaction is somehow a perversion of the 
process of raising capital in the public securities marketsY 
Another of the unique features of "going private" transactions is 
that the elimination of the public market in the stock of the corpora-
tion is often a purpose and usually the result of the transaction. One 
of the rationales offered by corporate management for "going pri-
vate" has been that by eliminating the public market for the stock of 
the corporation, the management is able to avoid tying the corpora-
tion to a market determination of the value of its stock. 48 No longer 
burdened by understated market value, the corporation can revalue 
upward the price of its stock for use in acquisitions and stock option 
programs. Although it has been suggested that this argument may be 
used as a shield for transactions designed to benefit insiders at the 
expense of the public, 49 there may be circumstances in which the 
elimination of a public market for the purpose of upward revaluation 
could be the basis for a finding of a valid business purpose. 50 
That "going private" transactions usually result in the elimination of 
a market for the securities of the corporation has another implication. 
"Going private" transactions most often take the form of a tender 
offer. 51 Although the offer is usually the first of two steps in the 
elimination of the minority,52 viewed alone, a tender offer might be 
seen as something other than a freeze-out. The argument in support 
of this view is that the tender offer invites a voluntary response and is 
not of itself a means by which the minority can be forced to do 
anything.53 One reponse to this argument is that where the two step 
process occurs, the coercion associated with the second step applies 
with equal force to the first step. Moreover, it has been persuasively 
argued that from the point of view of a public shareholder any move 
by the corporation that can eliminate the liquidity of his investment is 
inherently coercive.54 Tender offers that may eliminate the public 
46 I d. at 84,695. 
<1 Id. 
48 See Note, supra note 5, at 908-09. 
49 !d. at 923. 
50 I d. at 922-24; see also Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
51 See Borden, supra note 5, at 987-88. 
52 The second step is a merger or reverse stock split. Id. 
53 But see id. at 1004-05. 
54 See Borden, supra note 5, at 1004-05. See also Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 
3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969). 
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market for the stock of a corporation may be the most coercive means 
of "going private" since nontendering stockholders in a successful 
tender offer cannot obtain even the cash offered for their stock. 
Thus, tender offers that do not include some protection for the ini-
tially nontendering stockholder should clearly be treated as a species 
of freeze-out. A recent tender offer by Purity Supreme, a Mass-
achusetts corporation,_ seems calculated to avoid this danger. The 
offer contains a representation that the broker making a market for 
the stock would continue to do so. 55 
Finally, "going private" transactions are unique in that one of their 
principal objectives is to avoid the obligations imposed by the federal 
securities laws on public companies.56 In "going private," the man-
agement of a corporation typically hopes to reduce the number of the 
corporation's stockholders to the point at which registration57 and 
reporting58 under the Securities Exchange Act of 193459 (hereinafter 
the 1934 Act) are no longer required. An additional objective in 
"going private" may be to disqualify the corporation's securities for 
listing on one of the exchanges. As a result of the structure of the 
1934 Act, deregistration has the additional results of eliminating the 
application of the proxy rules60 and the insider trading rules. 61 
In conclusion, it is apparent that, in contrast to other forms of 
freeze-outs, "going private" transactions may often serve legitimate 
corporate ends. Those ends may include the opportunity for the pri-
vate corporation to upwardly revalue its stock, and to avoid the often 
expensive registration requirements imposed on publicly traded se-
curities. 
Ill. THE IMPACT OF DONOHUE ON FREEZE-OUTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Prior to the decision in Donohue, it would have been difficult to 
advise a client with any confidence whether Massachusetts law permits 
a freeze-out. One of the few decisions that seems to have any bearing 
on freeze-outs is Joseph v. Wallace Murray Corp. 62 In joseph, a minority 
stockholder sought to enjoin a short-form merger that seemed to be 
the final step in the acquisition of that corporation by another. The 
minority holder originally dissented from the merger and demanded 
55 PURITY SUPREME INC., PROSPECTUS: OFFER TO PURCHASE, (October 23, 1975). A copy 
of the Purity Supreme, Inc. Prospectus is available for inspection at the offices of the 
Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. 
58 Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
57 Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1970). 
58 Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970). 
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970). 
80 Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). 
81 Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). 
82 354 Mass. 477, 238 N.E.2d 360 (1968). 
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an appraisal of his stock, but later sought to set the transaction aside 
altogether. The defendant's plea in bar, upheld by the Court, was that 
the plaintiffs pursuit of his statutory appraisal right constituted an 
election. 63 The holding of the Court seems to be only that where a 
stockholder, having full knowledge of the facts, elects to seek ap-
praisal, the election is conclusive. 64 The Court also seemed to say that, 
absent fraud or illegality, the remedy of appraisal is exclusive, as sec-
tion 98 of chapter 156B of the General Laws provides.65 The plaintiff 
apparently did not explicitly contend that the freeze-out could not be 
justified under any circumstances, although it is difficult to be confi-
dent that the Court fully described the contentions raised. In any 
event, the Court did not directly consider the question whether and in 
what circumstances a freeze-out was authorized. 
The Court did, however, distinguish its earlier decision in Cole v. 
Wells. 66 The Cole case involved an asset sale by which the majority 
stockholders of a corporation attempted to convert the corporation 
into a business trust. 67 The plaintiff, a minority stockholder, alleged 
that the purpose of the transaction was to appropriate more profits 
and assets to the majority than they would-otherwise receive. 68 Al-
though the transaction did not involve a freeze-out, and although the 
Court dealt principally with the issue whether the plaintiff had elected 
his remedy by first claiming appraisal, the Court also held that if the 
allegations of the bill were true, the transaction would be a fraud on 
the corporation and could be set aside. 69 Cole was apparently distin-
guished in Joseph on the _ground that, unlike the plaintiff in Cole, the 
plaintiff in joseph knew all the facts before seeking appraisal.7° 
Thus, prior to Donohue, the Court had provided no certain guid-
ance as to how it would analyze a freeze-out. Similarly, the Court's 
treatment of dealings by a corporation in its own shares provided no 
clear answers. The Court had previously been critical of efforts of ma-
jority stockholder-directors to improve their control positions by caus-
ing the corporation to sell stock to them. 71 The Court has even sug-
gested that in some circumstances sales of stock by the corporation to 
insiders must be pursuant to a pro rata offer. 72 Similarly, the Court 
has held that directors may not properly cause the corporation to 
63 Id. at 480, 238 N.E.2d at 362. 
64 !d., 238 N .E.2d at 363. 
6> Id., 238 N.E.2d at 362. 
66 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916). 
67 Id. at 511, 113 N.E. at 189. 
6s !d. at 506, 113 N.E. at 189. 
69 Id. at 515, 113 N.E. at 192. 
70 354 Mass. at 480, 238 N .E.2d at 362-63. 
71 C.E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 107, 175 N.E. 86, 90 
(1931); accord, Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 523, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907). 
72 C.E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 275 Mass. at 108, 175 N.E.2d at 90. 
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purchase stock with a view to shifting control. 73 These decisions sug-
gested that the Court might have viewed freeze-outs as another 
species of transaction in which corporate insiders attempted to use 
corporate powers to shift or perpetuate control. 
Other lines of decision, however, suggested that the Court would take a 
different view of a freeze-out, particularly in the light of the joseph 
decision. Foremost among them is the line of cases, culminating in the 
Donohue decision, in which the Court dealt with corporate purchases of 
stock from insiders. 74 In applying the rule that such purchases would be 
permitted where there was no prejudice to the rights of other stockhold-
ers, ·the Court was extremely insensitive to the impact of such purchases 
upon the minority shareholders in those corporations. 75 
In other cases as well, the Court had taken a relatively mechanical 
view of the realities of corporate existence. For example, in Lewis v. 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 76 the Court upheld a purchase of a portion of 
the stock owned by a retiring corporate employee made pursuant to a 
charter provision making common stock callable. The Court reasoned 
that those purchasing the stock knew of its call feature and had to ac-
cept the consequences. 77 It further held, without analysis, that the 
purchase had been made in "good faith."78 These decisions suggested 
that, with respect to a freeze-out, the Court might have adopted the 
view that there could be no wrong in carrying out a transaction speci-
fically authorized by statute. 
Thus, the decisional law relative to transactions that raised issues of 
corporate fiduciary duty was ambiguous. The state of affairs, coupled 
with the lack of a direct treatment of a freeze-out in any previous 
case, provided great latitude for the Donohue decision. 
Donohue is useful in predicting the future treatment of corporate 
freeze-outs. For close corporations, it is clear that the Donohue decision 
means that freeze-outs will rarely, if ever, be allowed. The duty of 
utmost good faith and loyalty that the stockholders of such corpora-
tions now owe to one another79 would seem to preclude any trans-
actions wherein one group of stockholders eliminated another. One pos-
sible exception might be on facts like those presented by Matteson v. 
Ziebarth, 80 in which a minority stockholder might be considered to 
have violated his duty of loyalty to the remaining stockholders by 
73 Andersen v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346-47, 90 N.E.2d 
541, 544 (1950). 
74 Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949); Barrett v. W.A. 
Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931). 
7
' See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1177, 1179 n.18 (1950). 
76 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954). 
77 /d. at 676, 121 N.E.2d at 853. 
18Jd. 
79 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1315-16, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
80 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952). 
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stubbornly blocking a transaction in the best interests of all 
stockholders.81 In such circumstances, the majority might be justified 
in freezing out the lone dissenter in the interest of the corporation. 82 
It is difficult to conceive of any other set of circumstances in which 
the Court would be likely to find an interest that outweighed the right 
of the minority to the loyalty of the majority. 
Since the Donohue decision is expressly limited both in holding and 
rationale to close corporations,83 analyzing its probable impact on the 
law as it relates to publicly held corporations involves a degree of 
speculation. Nonetheless, Donohue may well signal a change in the 
Court's approach to the relations of stockholders in widely held cor-
porations because it suggests that ( 1) the Court will look more criti-
cally at the purposes and effects of corporate transactions, (2) the 
Court will give substantive content to fiduciary principles, and (3) ma-
jority stockholders will be held to a fiduciary standard in dealing with 
the corporation and minority stockholders. 
In the context of close corporations, the Court in Donohue aban-
doned the no-prejudice analysis of stock redemptions. The no-
prejudice rule required that the transaction be set aside if it were 
found to be prejudicial to the rights of creditors or other 
stockholders. 84 It had been pointed out in the past that a stock re-
demption, even at a fair price, might prejudice other stockholders by 
reducing the asset of the corporation -cash -that has the clearest 
value and that is available for the payment of dividends. 85 Despite this 
possibility, the Supreme Judicial Court continued to uncritically as-
sume that if the redemptions were at a fair price, no one was 
harmed.86 The Donohue decision represents a significant break with 
that approach because, for the first time, the Court concedes that the 
purchase of stock from a single stockholder operates as a preferential 
distribution of the assets of the corporation, even where the price is 
fair. 87 In changing its view of the possible consequences of such trans-
actions, the Court may be moving toward a more critical view of the 
rationales commonly offered to justify various corporate transactions. 
The Donohue decision may also presage an inclination by the Court 
81 See id. at 305, 242 P.2d at 1036. 
82 In this regard, Donohue is consistent with the prevailing view. See Borden, supra 
note 5, at 1019-20; Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests By Cash Merger: Two Recent 
Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699, 709 (1975). 
83 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1315-16, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
84 Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 178,85 N.E.2d 313,317 (1949); Barrett 
v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 309, 175 N.E. 765, 768 (1931). 
85 See Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 482, 123 N.W. 102, 104-05 (1909) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
86 See Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N .E.2d 313 ( 1949); Barrett v. W. 
A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 Mass. 765 (1931).· 
87 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1323-24, 328 N.E.2d at 518. 
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to move away from an ad hoc analysis of fiduciary responsibilities. 
Throughout its decisions dealing with corporate law, the Court has 
stated that the directors and officers bear a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration and its stockholders. 88 Yet the Court has rarely given sub-
stantive content to that duty. In the Donohue decision, the Court obvi-
ously changed the general standard of fiduciary duty owed by stock-
holders to each other in a close corporation. Of perhaps greater signi-
ficance, however, may be the willingness of the Court to amplify its 
understanding of that duty by adding that no purchase- of stock may 
be made from a member of the controlling group without first offer-
ing to make the purchase pro rata. 89 The Court's promulgation of a 
rule of general application makes Donohue a great deal more helpful 
than it would otherwise have been. 
In the case of a freeze-out, including an effort by a publicly held 
corporation to "go private," Donohue thus suggests that if the Court 
does not simply adopt a rule that such transactions are always permit-
ted or always proscribed, it will at least be inclined to do more than 
analyze the fairness of the transaction on an ad hoc basis. The ap-
proach of the Court in Donohue, if applied consistently, suggests that 
the Court will instead adopt a standard, like the business purpose test, 
with which to measure "going private" transactions. Although stan-
dards like the business purpose test are hardly precise,90 they do focus 
analysis on relevant factors and tend to substantially confine the re-
gion of dispute. 
Finally, the Donohue decision strongly implies that the law of Mass-
achusetts will for the first time fully recognize that the stockholders 
of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other. Prior 
to Donohue, the law of Massachusetts seems to have been represented 
by the decision of Mairs v. Madden. 91 Mairs involved an offer by an 
outsider to purchase all the stock of the corporation. After receiving 
the offer, the majority stockholder-directors bought up the stock of 
minority stockholders without disclosing the existence of the offer. 92 
The purpose underlying the purchase of the minority stock was to 
prevent acceptance of the tender offer. The Court held that al-
legations setting forth these facts, with the additional assertion that 
88 See, eg., American Discount Corp. v. Kaitz, 348 Mass. 706, 206 N.E.2d 577 (1965); 
Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 165 N.E. 889 (1929); Albert E. Touchet, 
Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928); Abbot v. Waltham Watch Co., 260 
Mass. 81, 156 N.E. 897 (1927); Reed v. A.E. Little Co., 256 Mass. 442, 152 N.E. 918 
( 1926). 
89 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1323, 328 N.E.2d at 521. 
90 See Investor Comments Favor SEC "Going Private" Proposals: Bar Opposes Them, 318 
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., A-1, A-5 (September 10, 1975). 
91 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940). 
92 Id. at 381, 30 N.E.2d at 245. 
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both the sellers and buyers were stockholders, did not state a cause of 
action, since no fiduciary relationship was alleged. 93 
Donohue explicitly overruled Mairs and related cases as they apply to 
close corporations.94 In Donohue, the Court also suggested, when it 
contrasted the strict standard with the more lenient standard appli-
cable to public corporations, that the Mairs rationale would not be fol-
lowed in the case of public corporations. 95 In making that compari-
son, the Ceurt refered not to the Massachusetts rule, but to the rule 
"set out in many jurisdictions" that the majority has the right to con-
trol but in doing so occupies a fiduciary relation to the minority. 96 
The citation in support of the fiduciary standard includes cases involv-
ing freeze-outs by dissolution, 97 and clearly implies that in such cir-
cumstances the standard will apply in Massachusetts. 
Thus, should a case involving a "going private" transaction reach 
the Court, in all likelihood the analysis will begin with the understand-
ing that the majority shareholders occupy a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to the minority. The Court is therefore likely to examine the 
fairness of the transaction to the minority: whether the minority may 
properly be forced out, and, if so, whether the consideration offered 
for their shares is fair. 
IV. SoME CoMMENTS ON "GOING PRIVATE" FROM A PosT-DONOHUE POINT OF VIEW 
If the Donohue decision does indeed presage the adoption of a more 
critical view of freeze-outs even in the context of a public corporation, 
a critical view of the arguments against "going-private" transactions 
may nevertheless be in order. The developing debate98 concerning 
such transactions has been focused on both empirical and policy ques-
tions. On the empirical level, there have been competing claims con-
cerning the actual economic impact of SEC compliance. Those oppos-
ing "going private" transactions have tended to belittle the arguments 
made by the proponents of "going private" concerning the costs of 
compliance with SEC reporting requirements. 99 
On a policy level, the debate seems to turn on what one considers to 
be the "corporation." Professor Borden, an authority on "going pri-
93 Id. at 380, 30 N.E.2d at 244. See also Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 105 
N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952); Leventhal v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 316 Mass. 194, 198-99, 55 
N.E.2d 20, 23 (1944). 
94 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1322, 328 N.E.2d at 517. 
95 Id. at 1316, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16. 
96 Id. at 1316 n.20, 328 N.E.2d at 516 n.20. 
97 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1947). 
98 Compare Borden, supra note 5, at 1002-13, with Note, supra note 5, at 907-08, and 
Sommer, supra note 44, at 84,693-700. 
99 See Note, supra note 5, at 907. 
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vate," has forcefully made the argument, which a practioner advising a 
public company would also be likely to make, that the responsibilities 
of management to the public securities market tend to divert attention 
from running the business of the corporation, and to result in deci-
sions that may not be in the best interest of the corporation as a busi-
ness entity. 100 In making this argument, Professor Borden seems to 
view the "corporation" as a composite of a number of different con-
stituencies, only one of which is the corporation's public stockholders. 
On the other hand, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Sommer 
seems to view the corporation from the point of view of the public in-
vestor. Commissioner Sommer believes that the interests of the corpo-
ration are necessarily advanced by compliance with the federal se-
curities laws. 101 Under this theory, a corporation that "goes private" is 
harmed by the termination of the burdens and attendant protections 
of the federal securities laws. Thus, avoiding the securities law re-
quirements cannot be a valid business purpose for the transaction. 102 
Those opposing "going private" transactions also draw support for 
their views from the historical context of most transactions, which as 
pointed out above, has tended to involve repurchases by a corporation 
at prices greatly below those at which the shares were previously sold 
to the public by insiders. The ability of insiders to sell stock to the 
public at a relatively high price, and later to reacquire the same stock 
at a much lower price, understandably troubles those concerned with 
the maintenance of strong public securities markets. Investors who 
experience or read about such transactions may well infer that the 
market has somehow been manipulated by insiders to the detriment 
of the public. 103 Nonetheless, one must question whether this conclu-
sion overemphasizes the importance of the immediate past. Whatever 
the industry's responsibility for the existence of the hot issues market 
may be, neither the securities industry nor corporate managements 
have created or wished the general decline in stock prices in the last 
few years. One suspects that most corporate managers who took their 
companies public had every intention of remaining public. Subsequent 
developments have doubtlessly disappointed the management of such 
companies even more than their public stockholders. It may thus be 
unfair to corporate management to suggest that there is something 
invidious about "going private." 
It seems, therefore, that an opponent of "going private" trans-
actions from this historical point of view should be contending that the 
interest in investor confidence in the public securities market is such 
100 See Borden, supra note 5, at 1002-13. 
101 See Sommer, supra note 44, at 84,695. 
102 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. '180,104, at 85,093 (SEC 1975). 
103 See Sommer, supra note 44, at 84,699. 
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that corporate management cannot be allowed to take advantage of 
the decline in stock prices even for the benefit of the corporation as a 
going concern. Concern for investor confidence may be perfectly ap-
propriate from the point of view of an agency such as the SEC, which 
is charged with regulating the securities industry. Indeed, in the face 
of repeated holdings by the federal courts that "going private" trans-
actions as such violate no existing policy of the federal securities 
laws, 104 the SEC has proposed regulations that would limit the ability 
of issuers to "go private." 105 Nonetheless, given the existence of such 
regulations on the federal level, there remains a substantial question 
whether state courts interpreting state corporate laws ought to con-
cern themselves with the federal policies dealing with the public se-
curities market. 106 
The securities-market-oriented view of "going private" transactions 
may well be too narrow a view for a state court reviewing such a 
transaction from the perspective of the business purpose test. The 
presumption that the interests of the "corporation" and the public in-
vestor are or ought to be coextensive seems misplaced. As Professor 
Borden has pointed out, the interest of a public investor in a corpora-
tion tends to be relatively short-term and market-oriented. 107 Such an 
interest might be well-served by a freeze-out on terms in excess of the 
prevailing market price. Even where the short-term investor stands to 
lose part of his investment when a corporation "goes private," the fact 
alone should not preclude the transaction when the long-term owners 
and the corporation pose valid business reasons for doing so. 
If the business purpose test for freeze-outs were adopted, 108 a pro-
hibition on "going private" transactions would also have the peculiar 
result of making the analysis turn on the means-a public issue-by 
which the stockholders who are frozen-out acquired their shares. 
Further, in view of current thinking that suggests that of all freeze-
outs, "going private" transactions have the greatest tendency to be jus-
tifiable under the business purpose test, 109 a prohibition on those 
transactions, and not on freeze-outs in general, is illogical. 
As important as the policies underlying the securities laws are, a 
prohibition on freeze-outs in general and "going private" transactions 
in particular seems to permit the tail of securities law to wag the dog 
104 See, e.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972); cases cited in 
Greenberg v. Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP .• 95,231, at 98,221 (Civ. No. 74-3866, S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975). 
105 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. 
L. REP. '80,104, at 85,089 (SEC 1975). 
108 But see Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. at 45, 342 A.2d at 570; 
People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.2d at 122, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 552. 
107 See Borden, supra note 5, at 1015-18. 
1os See text at note 86 supra. 
109 See text at notes 46-48 supra. 
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of corporate law. Only if one assumes that the securities laws in all 
contexts promote a more just regime in the corporate world would 
such a result make sense. The Donohue decision suggests that state 
corporate principles are capable of dealing with the situation without 
the necessity of a per se rule, which would unduly restrict the Court's 
flexibility. 
§17.2. Closely Held Corporations: Fiduciary Duty of Majority 
Stockholders. The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Donohue v. 
Rodd Electrotype Co. 1 will have a substantial impact on corporate prac-
tice in Massachusetts. The facts of the case reflect a typical state of af-
fairs in closely held corporations. At the time suit was filed, a total of 
248 shares of Rodd Electrotype Co. stock were outstanding. Fifty of 
the shares were owned by the plaintiff-Mrs. Donohue-and her 
son. 2 The remaining 198 shares were owned by members of the Rodd 
family: Harry Rodd, president of the corporation, owned 81 shares, 
and Rodd's three children owned 39 shares each.3 At a special meet-
ing of the board of directors, Harry Rodd resigned as a director of 
the corporation. The remaining directors authorized a purchase by 
the corporation of 45 of Rodd's 81 shares at a price of $800 per 
share.4 The ostensible reason for the repurchase was to induce Rodd, 
who was 78 years old, to relinquish an active role in the corporation's 
affairs.5 Rodd completed divestiture of his stock by either selling or 
giving the remaining shares to his children. 6 
The plaintiff was unaware of the corporate purchase of Rodd's 
shares for approximately nine months, when a special meeting of the 
corporation was convened. 7 At that meeting, the plaintiff refused to 
ratify the transaction, and she and her son offered their shares to the 
corporation on the same terms as Rodd had received. 8 The corpora-
tion refused the offer and the plaintiff brought suit on the ground 
that the defendant controlling group caused the defendant corpora-
tion to purchase the shares in violation of their fiduciary duty to her.9 
The trial judge, following the well-established no-prejudice rule, 10 
§17.2. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 328 N.E.2d 505. 
2 Id. at 1302 n.8, 328 N.E.2d at 510 n.8. 
3 /d. at 1301, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
4 I d. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1302, 328 N.E.2d at 510. The Court stated that with respect to the gift of the 
stock to the children, it could be inferred that such gift was a "part of the 'deal' for the 
stock purchase." ld. at 1302 n.7, 328 N.E.2d at 510 n.7. 
7 Id. at 1303, 328 N.E.2d at 510. 
8 I d. 
9 Id. at 1296, 328 N.E.2d at 508. 
10 The no-prejudice rule validated corporate transactions that had been carried out in 
good faith and with inherent fairness. See Andersen v. Andersen Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 
343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 
(1949); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937); Bar-
rett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931). 
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held that the purchase of Rodd's stock by the corporation did not prej-
udice plaintiffs rights. 11 The trial judge accepted the reason ad-
vanced for the repurchase by the defendants. 12 He further found that 
the price paid for the stock was less than the liquidating value of the 
shares of the corporation, so that the repurchase increased the value 
of each of the corporation's remaining shares. 13 The Appeals Court 
affirmed the decision of the trial judge.14 On appeal from the ruling 
below, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the stockholders of a 
closely held corporation owe the same duty to each other that part-
ners owe each other, and that members of a controlling group of 
stockholders may not cause the corporation to purchase the shares of 
a member of that group without offering to purchase, on a pro rata 
basis and at the same price, the shares of the remaining stock-
holders.15 The Court suggested that the plaintiff was entitled to two 
alternative forms of relief: (1) a judgment requiring Harry Rodd to remit 
the cash he had received for his stock, with interest; or, (2) an order 
requiring the corporation to purchase the plaintiff's shares for the same 
price as that paid for Rodd's. 16 
The Donohue case provided the Court with an opportunity to recon-
sider the validity of the no-prejudice rule. Under the no-prejudice 
rule, agreements by a corporation to purchase its own stock are " 'sub-
ject ... to the limitations that the purchase must be made in good faith 
and without prejudice to creditors and stockholders.' "17 The purchase 
price of Rodd's stock was less than the liquidation value of that stock 
on the corporation's books. Under a traditional no-prejudice analysis, 
this fact would have validated the transaction. Nonetheless, despite 
the seemingly advantageous terms of the purchase, it appeared that 
the transaction in total had caused injury to the minority stockholders. 
The purchase of the stock substantially reduced the liquid assets of 
the corporation and enabled the selling stockholder to convert his 
shares into the only corporate asset-cash-having a certain vah,1e. 
Moreover, it appeared that the rationale offered for the purchase was 
insubstantial from a corporate standpoint because the purchase of a 
portion of Harry Rodd's ownership in the company did not wrest con-
trol from the previously controlling Rodd family group. 18 Thus, 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1296-97, 328 N.E.2d at 508. 
12 Record at 25, Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 328 
N .E.2d 505 [hereinafter cited as Record]. 
13 Record at 27. 
14 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 165, 307 N.E.2d 8 (rescript opinion). 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1323-24, 328 N.E.2d at 518. 
16 /d. at 1331-32, 328 N.E.2d at 520-21. 
17 Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 174-75, 85 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1949), 
quoting Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 418, 195 N.E. 749, 751 (1935). 
18 The Court treated the Rodd family as a single group controlling the corporation 
because of the strong similarity of interests which they possessed. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1328-30, 328 N.E.2d at 519-20. 
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legitimate injury had been sustained by the minority shareholders, 
whereas the purchase accomplished little for the corporation. 
To create a cause of action for such an injury, the Court could have 
expanded the no-pr~judice rule. Instead, the Court chose to abandon 
that rule, and adopt the strict fiduciary duty rule. This approach was 
necessitated by the similarity of interests existing between partners in 
a partnership on the one hand and the managers and directors of a 
close corporation on the other. 19 In the Court's view, the mere corpo-
rate form was an insufficient basis for the maintenance of different 
standards of duty.20 
The Donohue decision obliquely suggests a change in the Court's 
view of the relationship among the stockholders of publicly held 
corporations. 21 Whatever form that that change may take, it is clear 
that the most direct impact of the Donohue decision will be on stock 
repurchases by close corporations. There are doubtlessly many out-
standing purchase agreements of the Donohue variety. The Donohue 
decision will now draw the validity of those agreements into question. 
The Court indicated that the requirement that the remaining stock-
holders receive an equal opportunity to sell to the corporation would 
not obtain in cases in which such stockholders gave advance consent. 22 
Where such consent takes the form of a provision in the articles of in-
corporation or by-laws, Donohue seemed to indicate that mere partici-
pation in the corporation would bind such remaining stockholders. 
This result follows from the assumption that, by participating, a stock-
holder can be deemed to have consented to the provision in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, the application of this assumption to any agree-
ment in which all stockholders are not parties is questionable. It 
would seem that such an agreement would bind only signatory stock-
holders unless some other act could be construed to bind the others. 
The obvious act of stockholder approval would be the approval of the 
agreement to purchase by the stockholders of the corporation, par-
ticularly if the approval had been unanimous. Yet, even this act of 
approval may not suffice to bind the stockholders. Since the right to 
equal opportunity is a personal right and not a derivative one,23 a 
stockholder who, although not a party to a stockholder's agreement, 
19 /d. at 1306, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
20 Id. at 1313-16, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. 
21 For a discussion of the changes that the Donohue case may signal for publicly held 
corporations see § 17.1, supra. The decisions of the Court prior to Donohue held that the 
stockholders of a corporation do not stand in any sort of fiduciary relationship to one 
another. See Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 105 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1952); Eno Sys., 
Inc. v. Eno, 311 Mass. 334, 341, 41 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1942); Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 
378, 380, 30 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1940); Bell v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 278 Mass. 60, 75, 179 
N.E. 294, 299 (1932). 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1323 n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24. 
23 Id. at 1296 n.4, 328 N.E.2d at 508 n.4. 
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had voted to approve it, might still be entitled to equal opportunity in 
a personal capacity. That is, in voting to authorize the corporation to 
enter a stock purchase agreement with other stockholders, the stock-
holder only approved the participation of the corporation, and did 
not waive his personal right vis-a-vis other stockholders to be treated 
equally in the distribution of corporate assets. Thus, in any case in 
which less than all stockholders are themselves parties to a stock 
purchase agreement, Donohue may mean that a corporate purchase of 
a controlling member's shares will give rise to a right of equal partici-
pation by nonparty stockholders. 
The Donohue case will also cause a reevaluation of other means by 
which minority stockholders can be disadvantaged by the majority. 
Recognizing this possibility, Justice Wilkins filed a brief concurring 
opinion in which he questioned the advisability of extending the 
Donohue rationale to areas such as salary and dividend policy. 24 In the 
face of this comment, the majority's failure to so limit Donohue clearly 
suggests that it intended to permit consideration of these topics, and 
most probably envisions further consideration of related areas of cor-
porate policy. The suggestion that Donohue is intended to have a 
broad impact is buttressed by the overall flavor of the majority opin-
ion. For example, in a footno~e intended to limit the opinion to trans-
actions to which the corporation is a party, the Court stated: 
We stress that the strict fiduciary duty which we apply to stock-
holders in a close corporation in this opinion governs only their 
actions relative to the operations of the enterprise and the effects 
of that operation on the rights and investments of other 
stockholders .... 25 
The Court's inclusion of the qualifying word "only" does little to dis-
pel the notion that it intended to extend the strict fiduciary duty rule 
to a broad range of transactions. 
The broad impact that Donohue may have upon closely held corpo-
rations is perhaps advisable in view of the many devices legitimated 
only by the corporate form, in which majority stockholders may dis-
advantage minority stockholders. The Court's list of such devices in-
cludes the manipulation of salary and dividend policies, property 
transactions between the stockholders and the corporation, the ma-
nipulation of corporate eiilployment, stock purchases, and the issuance 
of stock. 26 Under prior law, each of these devices has been analyzed 
solely from the viewpoint of the duty of the officers and directors 
controlling the corporation or involved in the transaction to the 
24 /d. at 1333, 328 N.E.2d at 521. 
25 /d. at 1315 n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18 (emphasis in original). 
28 /d. at 1309-13, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14. 
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corporation.27 At least in the case of close corporations, Donohue may 
require a reanalysis from the point of view of the stockholders' duties 
to one another. The standard to be applied in such analysis will pre-
sumably be the partnership standard of utmost good faith and loyalty. 
The Donohue case may have an impact on at least one other kind of 
transaction-where majority shareholders cause the issuance of addi-
tional stock, thereby solidifying the majority's control position and di-
luting the position of other stockholders. Historically, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has been sensitive to this particular abuse of corporate 
position and has held that a stock issuance that served personal in-
terests, rather than corporate interests, violates the duty of the con-
trolling stockholder-directors to the corporation. 28 The Court in Donohue 
indicates that in addition to this derivative right, the stockholders of a 
closely held corporation will personally have the right to challenge the 
issuance of stock to the majority stockholders. 29 As a result, although 
the stockholders of all close corporations do not have preemptive 
rights in all stock issuances,30 they now have a personal right to relief 
where the majority has caused a stock issuance in violation of its duty 
of utmost good faith and loyalty. 
Significantly, Donohue also seems to imply that salary-dividend 
policies in close corporations will be reanalyzed.31 The Court points 
out that judicial reluctance to interfere with management in the decla-
ration of dividends has resulted in a requirement that a challenging 
stockholder prove an abuse of a director's discretion. 32 At the same 
time, the courts have been less reluctant to decide the reasonableness 
of salaries because courts can use a more objective standard in making 
that determination.33 Obviously, through the manipulation of salary-
dividend policies, the majority stockholders can direct corporate earn-
ings to themselves and deny them to the minority. The strict fiduciary 
standard adopted by the Court should call for closer scrutiny of the 
fairness of dividend and salary decisions, and thereby lessen the pos-
sibilities for abuse that existed under the old standard. 
The Court expressly extended the strict fiduciary duty to all the 
stockholders of the corporation.34 The Court accomplished this result 
by asserting that an unscrupulous minority might do equal damage to 
an unsuspecting minority.35 No doubt there are cases in which minor-
27 See cases cited at note 18 supra. 
28 L.E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 175 N.E. 86 (1931); 
Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907). 
29 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1326 n.25, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25. 
3o G.L. c. 156B, § 20. 
31 See text at notes 24-26 supra. 
32 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1311, 328 N.E.2d at 513. 
33 Id. at 1311 n.15, 328 N.E.2d at 514 n.15. 
34 /d. at 1315 n.17, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17. 
35 Id. See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
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ity stockholders ought to be limited in their dealings with the corpora-
tion or the majority stockholders. An across-the-board application of 
the strict fiduciary duty rule to minority stockholders, however, would 
appear to ignore some of the ways in which corporations and partner-
ships do differ. For example, where a corporation sells property to or 
buys it from a noncontrolling stockholder, the buying or selling stock-
holder cannot be said to control both sides of the transaction. Pre-
sumably, the corporation would authorize an officer or director to 
deal with the minority stockholder. In most instances, the minority 
stockholder would not be in a position to influence either the decision 
to buy or sell or the exact terms of the agreement. In such circum-
stances it is hard to see why a minority stockholder should be treated 
any differently than an unrelated buyer or seller. If such a transaction 
is subjected to a standard of utmost good faith and loyalty, a minority 
stockholder, who has dealt with the corporation, may find that he has 
guaranteed the benefit of the transaction to the corporation. It is 
questionable whether any policy, other than analytical symmetry for 
its own sake, requires this result. 
One apparent attempt to limit the impact of Donohue arises in the 
Court's express limitation of the strict fiduciary duty rule to trans-
actions in the shares of a corporation to which the corporation itself is a 
party. 36 The Court thus avoided comment on the issue raised by cases like 
Perlman v. Feldman 31 in which controlling stockholders have sold their 
shares to third parties Although the Court's reluctance to involve itself in 
the issue is admirable, the Court's anal~gy to partnerships will almost 
surely overcome the attempted limitation. It has long been established 
that one of the fundamental results flowing from the personal nature of 
partnerships is that the identity of the participants may not be altered 
without unanimous consent. 38 By separating ownership from manage-
ment, corporations typically change that result. Nonetheless, the Court's 
emphasis on the personal relationships among stockholders39 would seem 
to suggest that, like a member of a partnership, a stockholder in a close 
corporation would not be allowed to destroy that relationship by substitut-
ing another in his place. Many close corporations, of course, might recog-
nize the reality of the partnership analogy by effectively preventing the 
transfer of stock except to existing stockholders or approved successors. 
Donohue may ultimately turn this safeguard into a rule oflaw; namely, that 
the stockholders of close corporations cannot transfer their stock to 
outsiders without the consent of the other stockholders. 
The Donohue decision is thus likely to have a substantial impact on 
36 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1315 n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18. 
37 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See Zahn v. Transamerica 
Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). 
38 Kingman v. Spurr, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 235 (1828). 
39 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1315, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
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the law of both close corporations and corporations generally. The 
holding of the case, that minority stockholders must be given the op-
portunity to participate in a corporate stock purchase from a member 
of the controlling group, will raise questions as to the continuing va-
lidity of the many stock . purchase plans now in effect in close corpo-
rations. The teaching of Donohue, that the stockholders of a close corpo-
ration owe one another a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, will 
obviously have an even greater impact. Unless the Court retreats from 
its position, this rule indicates that the ability of majority stockholders 
to use the corporate form of doing business to disadvantage the 
minority will be sharply reduced. 
Finally, the Court's analogy to the fiduciary standard imposed upon 
partners may have the greatest impact by applying to closely held 
corporations the principles that have developed to govern the rela-
tionships .of partners among themselves. It will be interesting to see 
whether practitioners conclude that the distinction between partner-
ships and close corporations for state law purposes has largely disap-
peared. For example, if corporate forms may not be employed to vary 
personal relationships, will practitioners also conclude that corporate 
formalities, such as the election of directors, need not be followed in 
close corporations? If the legal principles a_p_plicable to close corpora-
tions come to closely resemble those applicable to partnerships, the 
question whether for tax purposes Massachusetts close corporations 
are associations or partnerships may also be raised. These and other 
issues remain undecided in the wake of the Donohue decision. Solu-
tions await further judicial analysis, prompted by the potentially broad 
implications that the case clearly contemplates. 
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